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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TO PANEL 3
QUESTION.- I see a contradiction in some of the points you have
made. When Professor Tushnet suggested that possibly we should
use a different terminology such as civil community, your response
was: Well, you were not sure that made a whole lot of difference;
the civil community really gets represented through state institu-
tions, be they the legislature or whatever. At an earlier point you
reminded us that courts are also institutions of government., Also,
while using Niebuhr's models, you changed them and at the end
went on to say, "Well, Niebuhr says, 'Leave it to the religious com-
munity.' " That which model is chosen is really your reaction of the
religious community and the community that responds to the reli-
gious community. And finally you said, "No normative choice needs
or should be made by the state. We should leave it to the religious
community to determine which of these models to choose." There is
some contradiction there. If in fact which model is chosen is a reac-
tion of the religious community and the others outside of the reli-
gious community to the religious community, does not that reaction
include not only the unstructured response you were talking about,
but also the structured response? Legislation can push the response
into one model or another. Court actions can push the response into
one model or the other. Does not a normative choice need to be
made - inevitably need to be made - to the extent that the civil
community is being responsive?
MICHAEL MCCONNELL: Well, is this the contradiction you had
in mind? That when answering Professor Tushnet, I resisted the dis-
tinction between the state and the civil society; but in the end of my
talk, I appealed to a distinction between state and civil society by
saying that the choice among these models ought to be left to civil
society and believers and not to the state? I think I accept that
charge; but, so amended, what I said still stands. But I think that is
a very helpful clarification.
QUESTION.- If you accept-the charge, then one of the statements
does not seem to be able to remain. If you accept the charge, then
as the civil society responds, that will be shown through actions of
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courts and/or legislatures. And should the Constitution be saying
something to us about which of the models courts and legislators
should be channeled towards in making their response? Or legisla-
tors and courts are not in essence part of this civil society? That the
civil society is this sort of amorphous, nonstructured institution
which the Constitution says nothing about? I am not sure how you
could accept my statement and then keep both of your responses at
the same time.
MICHAEL MCCONNELL: I may be too much of a lawyer here,
but in constitutional law when we ask the question: "Should the
Constitution be interpreted any particular way?," we are addressing
a question that applies to the state and, indeed, specifically to the
law, and not one that applies to the civil society - even though I
believe that ultimately the values of the law came from civil society.
In some sense this may be a long term/short term problem, and also
a question of the audience. In an immediate sense, my audience is
lawyers and courts and I ask them, insofar as they are custodians of
the law, not to try to resolve this problem. In a longer sense, my
audience has to be civil society, I say to them: "Insofar as you think
that the law ought to resolve this, it should not; but this is one of
those matters that ought to be resolved on a decentralized basis and
not through legal institutions." I do not want to say - in fact, it
would be completely contrary to my general political philosophy to
say - that there is no coherent distinction between the state and
the civil society. I believe in limited government, which is to say
that I believe that more ought to be on the civil society side and less
on the government side.
DOUGLAS STURM. I have always read the religion clauses of the
First Amendment as a statement pointing in two directions: towards
the practice of religion and towards the practice of politics. In a
sense, the religion clauses constitute a warning. We must be ever
cautious about both church and state, about both the community of
the spirit and the coercive community. Both have a propensity for
perversity. Both can be inhuman. Both can destroy. Both can dehu-
manize and degrade.
On the other hand, both the practice of religion and the practice
of politics are expressions of vital dimensions of our humanity. We
have, so far in our discussions during this Conference, avoided, the
central question of philosophical anthropology: What does it mean
to be human? Attending to this question will not, to be sure, solve
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all the nitty-gritty issues we have been discussing, but it might pro-
vide a context for our consideration of them.
In that connection, we might, for instance, approach the issue
Professor Lupu posed: Why, in the First Amendment, is religion sin-
gled out because religion, at its best, is a paradigmatic case of the
searching of the human spirit for truth, for beauty, for goodness, for
holiness? It is a paradigmatic case of the human spirit breaking the
conventions and boundaries in its wonderings and imaginings. It is a
paradigmatic case of the human spirit probing the deepest mysteries
of life and joining with others in its seeking and in its affirmations
about those mysteries. Respecting that movement of the human
spirit, we must, at the same time, respect those who have doubts
about the process: atheists and nihilists, cynics and the indifferent.
We must respect them, for the human spirit cannot be, in this pro-
cess, coerced. This is what lies behind the Free Exercise Clause: We
must respect the movements of the human spirit in this dimension
because that is at least part of what it means to be human. When
enlivened and awakened to the depths and mysteries of life, we can-
not rest satisfied with what we have been and are in our ordinary
existence. And we often join with others, organizing ourselves in va-
rious ways, as we engage in that searching and wondering. To me,
the religion clauses of the First Amendment constitute an acknowl-
edgement of and a deep respect for this dimension of our human
character.
As to political association, while we must, given any sensitive
reading of our history, acknowledge the perversities of politics, we
should also acknowledge its proper place in our common life. I am
not like Stanley Hauerwas or, say, Jacques Ellul who seems always
to see the state as a threat. At its best, government, as William
Penn affirmed, has a positive purpose. As religion is a paradigmatic
case of the search of the human spirit for things ultimate - the
good, the true, the beautiful - so government is a paradigmatic
case of the effort to organize ourselves in communities through
which we can empower and enable all persons to engage in that
search. Government thus has a more limited purpose than religion.
But this means it can go too far; it can overreach its proper bounda-
ries. Moreover, instead of empowering all citizens, it can function to
sustain established forms of economic and social injustice. So it does
in the United States with its vast gulf between the rich and the
poor, with its long history of racism and sexism. That is the perver-
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sity of government. But in contrast to the perversity of government
stands its proper purpose: to serve as institutional means of provid-
ing the economic, cultural, and social conditions for the flourishing
of the human spirit.
In sum, we must be ever cautious about the perversities of both
religious institutions and governmental forms. At the same time, our
task is to bend the religious and the political forces in our midst to
accomplish what they were intended to accomplish, namely, to en-
able us to be the best we can be.
MICHAEL MCCONNELL: Let me respond to that. You raise two
points. One is about to whom the First Amendment is directed; and
the second has to do with why religion is singled out. I think it is
simply wrong to say that the First Amendment is directed at both
church and state. That certainly is not what it says. What it says is:
"Congress shall make no law . . . ." And indeed, I would consider
it to be a gross overstepping of the authority of the people of the
United States had they purported to act through their Congress and
the various states in ratifying the First Amendment to instruct the
churches at all. It is not within the authority of the people to be
instructing the churches about what they should do. There are laws
which will keep not only churches but everyone else - equally,
without discrimination, without singling out churches especially -
from doing particular evil things. But the church as the church is
not within the jurisdiction even of the sovereign people of the United
States.
And that relates to your second point: Why is religion singled
out? Why is it that that statement can be uniquely made? I would
appeal to the text that you yourself read to us this morning, which
was Madison's explanation for this. I see two themes within it. One
is that the government is no judge of spiritual truth. So this has to
do with the competency of government. With regard to ordinary
public policy - how much pollution control should we have?
Should we go to war with Iraq? Should we build a road here? What
kind of law should be passed with respect to this, that, and the other
thing based upon various utilitarian calculuses - the state is the
appropriate decisionmaker for that. The state has competence to de-
cide that. Those are the decisions that we make together as a politi-
cal community. The state has no authority with respect to religious
truth; and when it speaks to religious truth, no one has any reason
to pay any attention to it whatsoever. And the second theme - ac-
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cording to Madison - is that when people enter into a civil society,
they come into it with preceding obligations to what he calls the
"Governor of the Universe." It is not because of humanness that
this is true. It is because of the sovereignty of God. The prior obli-
gations of the people to the ultimate sovereign derive from God's
nature, not human nature - which the government is simply inca-
pable of understanding, and which is prior to the government. Yes,
we are going to protect ourselves as a political community against
the excesses of religious communities when they do things that are
evil. We are going to do that just as we protect ourselves against
other evil things. But, no, the reason religion is singled out is that
the government is not allowed to move into that sphere. It is not
that the church is in any way limited by the First Amendment; it is
not limited by the First Amendment. It is the government that is
limited by the First Amendment.
QUESTION. I want to emphasize what I think is the dark side of
what you were talking about. Because I am very bothered by it. I
think it is a fundamental disagreement with what Professor McCon-
nell seems to be saying. He is talking as if, I guess, we are in East-
ern Europe making a constitution in which we have seen the state
separate from civil society. But the First Amendment, as I under-
stand it, grew out of historic experience of the Anglo-American peo-
ple; and I trace it back to the Toleration Act in which basically a
truce was called, not because the government was operating distinct
from civil society but because it was captured. And that in the
Western world, probably the greatest cause of internecine conflict
and murder was grounded in religious difference. I think the First
Amendment speaks to that very strongly. And so, with Professor
Lupu's comment: Why is it there? And looking for - maybe it is
an overstatement, but - a difference in kind about religion and to-
talitarian governments. Holmes told us, "Look to differences in de-
gree." And all you have to look to is historical experience. At their
time the degree that had become a difference, in terms of society's
slaughtering itself, was religion. And so, people were being whipped
in the colonies not because the state was the way a conservative
today looks at it, but because the state was captured by particular
religions that were whipping other religions. And I look at the First
Amendment as a truce asking us to stop that.
MICHAEL MCCONNELL: If anything was an establishment of re-
ligion to the people as of 1789, it was the Church of England. And I
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would submit to you that the Church of England did not represent
the church capturing the state, it represented the state capturing the
church. I do not want to offend any of my Anglican friends by re-
counting the history of the formation of that church; it is well
known to all of us. But the whippings that went on in Virginia were
not at the instigation of the church in Virginia, they were at the
instigation of the gentry in Virginia who had control over both
church and state and used both as an instrument of social control.
There were some places in this country in which it is easier to say
that the church had control over the state. This was much closer to
the model in Massachusetts; although even there, I think that the
tables were as frequently turned. But it is interesting that the estab-
lishment was not overthrown in New England. In the place where
the establishment seemed to be serving the church, rather than the
other way around, the establishment survived; and indeed, it ;Sur-
vived in Massachusetts until 1834. It was the places where the state
had taken over the church that were the object of disestablishment
in this country.
CHARLES STRAIN.- I think Professor Marshall started us off on a
very productive tack. In connection with the last speaker's com-
ments, I suggest that if we look critically at the Enlightenment's
version of the history of Europe that we will find that the Thirty
Years War was not so much a product of religions steering states
toward nefarious ends but quite the reverse. That war. involved
emerging nation-states prosecuting their nationalist aims in the
guise of religion. This leads me back to the original point that there
is a balance of danger intrinsic to the institutions of religious com-
munities trying to develop a thoughtful form of self-criticism.
Niebuhr's book, Christ and Culture,' is directed to the religious
communities and it says to them in effect: "Look, there are mulliple
ways in which the religious community is involved in the world and
in society, and there are strong points and weak points in each of
these models. It is not just a question of deciding between them but
really thinking through those strengths and weaknesses." Now, if
that kind of a voice were to become salient within religious commu-
nities, then some of the dangers that they represent would be
counteracted by a dialectic within the community itself. I am con-
cerned that in the Supreme Court's reasoning from case to case
1. H. RICHARD NIEBUHR, CHRIST AND CULTURE (1951)
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there is no equivalent to Niebuhr's critical awareness. In this case it
would be an awareness of the models of the state in its dealings with
religions that they are working out of and of the limits of those
models. I think that part of Professor McConnell's talk was leading
in that direction: that perhaps there ought to be something like
Niebuhr's book that the Justices ought to have in mind when they
begin to weigh these various cases, so that they can see the dangers
in their own positions. Perhaps I will leave it with a question. Do
you see evolving in the Court itself some judicial equivalent of
Niebuhr?
MICHAEL MCCONNELL: Unhappily, I do not. It is so dispiriting
to see Justices latch onto a particular formula and then just stick
with it even after it has become apparent to any reasonable observer
that it is counterproductive. And they also seem completely incapa-
ble in one case of thinking about the implications of what they say
in some other context.
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